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Abstract
This study examines if the blocking effect paradigm predicts 
causal judgments when consequences of events vary in 
valence and magnitude. The procedure consists on presenting 
participants with reports describing the positive or negative 
effects produced by different substances, when these are 
consumed either separately or simultaneously with others. 
Two groups of participants were exposed to high and low 
magnitude consequences, respectively. The extent to which 
behavior with respect to causal judgments is consistent with 
the predictions of the blocking effect was evaluated in in 
both groups using two types of questions. One of them 
asked whether or not substance X produced the effect, while 
the other one asked about the probability of substance X 
producing the effect. Differences in causal judgments as a 
product of logical or intuitive reasoning were examined. Even 
though the blocking effect was not observed, a significant 
interaction was obtained between the factors valence and 
experimental condition (blocking and control). Findings 
are discussed in terms of the differences between associative 
learning in humans and in non-human animals, and in 
terms of the theoretical differences between evaluative 
conditioning and predictive or causal conditioning.
Key words: causal judgments, blocking effect, associative 
learning, logical reasoning, intuitive reasoning, evaluative 
conditioning, predictive conditioning. 
Resumen
El propósito de este proyecto es examinar si el modelo de 
bloqueo predice la atribución de juicios causales al variar 
la valencia y la magnitud de las consecuencias. El arreglo 
experimental consiste en la presentación de reportes sobre 
los efectos positivos y negativos que producen diferentes 
sustancias al ser consumidas solas o en conjunto con otras. 
Los participantes del primer grupo estuvieron expuestos a 
consecuencias de alta magnitud y los del segundo grupo, a 
consecuencias de baja magnitud. Se evaluó si la atribución 
de causalidad es consistente con las predicciones del efecto 
bloqueo mediante dos tipos de pregunta: una pregunta acerca 
si la sustancia X produce o no el efecto, y una pregunta sobre 
la probabilidad de que X produzca el efecto. Se examinaron 
las diferencias en los juicios causales cuando las atribuciones 
son producto del razonamiento lógico o intuitivo. Si bien 
no se observó evidencia del efecto bloqueo, se obtuvieron 
efectos de interacción entre los factores valencia y condición 
experimental (sustancias bloqueo y control). Se discuten los 
hallazgos en términos de las diferencias entre el aprendizaje 
asociativo en humanos y animales no humanos, y en términos 
de las implicaciones sobre las diferencias teóricas entre el 
condicionamiento evaluativo y el condicionamiento predictivo.
Palabras clave: juicios causales, bloqueo, aprendizaje asociativo, 
razonamiento lógico, razonamiento intuitivo, condicionamiento 
evaluativo, condicionamiento predictivo.
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Recent developments in the study of human learning from 
a classical conditioning paradigm are focusing in the use 
of traditional experimental procedures to study complex 
human behavior (Walther, Nagengast & Trasselli, 2005; 
Rescorla, 1988). The blocking effect for example, has been 
examined in studies of perceptual responding (Arcediano, 
Matute & Miller, 1997), spatial orientation (Wilson & 
Alexander, 2008), the acquisition of reading and writing 
repertories (Didden, Prinsen & Sigafoos, 2000; Singh & 
Solman, 1990), stimulus class acquisition (Delgado & 
Medina, In press; Rehfeldt, Dixon, Hayes & Steele, 1998), 
and causal learning (see Shanks, 2010 for a review).
 The purpose of this study is to identify the conditions 
under which people make causality judgments in an 
ambiguous situation where an event may have two possible 
causes. In contrast to animal studies, experimental findings 
of the blocking effect in humans have not been as consistent 
(Livesey & Boakes, 2004). While some authors contend 
that the blocking effect accurately predict instances of 
human behavior (Crookes & Moran, 2003, Kruschke, 
Kapperman & Hetrick, 2005), others question that view 
(Beckers, de Vicq, & Baeyens, 2009; Delgado & Medina, 
in press; Laane, Aru & Dickinson, 2010; Rehfeldt, et 
al., 1998). In the case of experiments on casual learning 
research, the latter authors argue that when participants 
are exposed to a circumstance in which a consequence is 
produced by events A and AX (A+, AX+), attributions of 
causality to X have not been systematically observed.
 Traditional explanations describe that the blocking effect 
occurs because due to the history of associations between A 
and the US (unconditioned stimulus), stimulus A acquires 
all the associative strength of the US, making X redundant 
during AX+ presentations (Kamin, 1969). Even though 
other theories of the blocking effect have been proposed 
(e.g., Blaisdell, Gunther, & Miller, 1999; Mackintosh, 1975; 
Pearce & Hall, 1980), the circumstances responsible for the 
attenuation of responding to the target stimulus remain a 
subject of current investigation in human research (see De 
Houwer, 2009; De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Shanks, 2010).
 According to one of the dominant explanations for 
the inconsistent findings of the blocking effect in humans, 
responding to the target stimulus is influenced by the way 
in which participants process compound stimuli. (Glautier, 
2002, 2008; Livesey & Boakes, 2004; Williams, Sagness & 
McPhee, 1994). When stimuli are processed configurally 
participants respond to compound stimulus as a single 
stimulus event without discriminating its elements in terms 
of their function. By contrast, in elemental processing each 
of the elements of the compound acquire the functions 
of US independently (Glautier, 2002, 2008; Williams, 
Sagness & McPhee, 1994). 
 Experimental procedures in human causal learning 
have compared ratings of causality judgments of the target 
stimulus when participants are exposed to preparations 
facilitating either configural or elemental responding. 
The most commonly used procedures include: facilitating 
elemental approaches by specifying an additive effect, as 
in A+ and AX++ (Beckers, De Houwer, Pineno & Miller, 
2005; De Houwer, Beckers & Glautier, 2002; Livesey 
& Boakes, 2004; Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, & 
Frohardt, 2003); increasing the spatial separation of both 
of the stimuli in the compound, i.e., target and competitor 
(Glautier, 2002), and exposing participants to pre-trainings 
favoring either elemental or configural responding (De 
Houwer & Beckers, 2003). Findings from these studies 
have shown consistently that the blocking effect is generally 
predicted by elemental approaches only. According to these 
authors, if AX is perceived configurally, A+ will have no 
effect on subsequent AX+ pairings and therefore, X will 
not be redundant in the prediction of the consequence.
 Another factor that may account for the variability 
of findings in studies of the blocking effect in humans is 
the type of reasoning used to emit a causality judgment. 
Several authors support the idea that human causal learning 
studies involve logical and deliberate processes that cannot 
be sufficiently described by contingency learning approaches 
(De Houwer, Beckers & Vandorpe, 2005; De Houwer & 
Vandorpe, 2010; Karazinov & Boakes, 2007; Vandorpe & 
De Houwer, 2006; Vandorpe, De Houwer & Beckers, 2005; 
Walther, 2002; Walther, Nagengast & Trasselli, 2005).
 In this respect, it is argued that logical reasoning involves 
evaluating the likelihood of a consequence according to 
the available information. For example Vandorpe and 
De Houwer (2006), reported a lower blocking effect in 
human causality judgments when A and AX occurred 
with maximal intensity. By contrast, when target and 
competitor where presented with submaximal intensity 
blocking was more frequently observed. In addition, a larger 
number of participants reported an interest in obtaining 
more information about the effects of X, when A+ and 
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AX+ were presented with maximal intensity. According 
to these findings it may be easier to conclude that X does 
not contribute to the outcome when A and AX occur 
with submaximal intensity. By contrast, when outcomes 
are presented with maximal intensity the information 
about A and AX in relation to the outcome is insufficient 
to produce a reliable judgment as to the causal function 
of X (see also Beckers et al, 2005; De Houwer & Beckers, 
2003; De Houwer et al, 2002; Vandorpe et al, 2005).
 In addition, studies in evaluative conditioning and 
second order conditioning, show higher conditioning 
effects, or results that differ from what is expected from 
the conditioning procedure used, when the experimental 
preparation includes a task that interferes with deliberate 
reasoning. (Karazinov & Boakes, 2007; Walther, 2002). 
Nonetheless, the view that human causal learning cannot 
be sufficiently described by the principles of associative 
learning remains a subject of controversy (Beckers, Miller, 
De Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006; Beckers et al, 2005).
 Additional factors that may influence attribution of 
causality judgments are characteristics of the consequences 
such as their intensity and their positive or negative valence. 
For example, some animal experiments suggest that greater 
intensity outcomes may be associated with increased cue 
competition effects (i.e., more blocking). Specifically, it has 
been reported that learning occurs more rapidly and regardless 
of increments to the CS-US interval, when stimuli of high 
biological significance are used. (Domjan, Cusato & Krause, 
2004). Given the undefined relevance of the conventional 
and/or arbitrary stimuli used in studies with humans (e.g., 
operant equivalence studies), less cue competition effects 
(higher probability of conditioning of A and X) may be 
expected. However, a study by Denniston, Miller and Matute 
(1996) provides evidence to the contrary; that is, the authors 
suggest that higher biological significance protects against 
cue competition effects such as blocking and overshadowing 
(see also Oberling, Bristol, Matute & Miller, 2000). 
 On the other hand, evaluative conditioning studies 
have examined conditioning processes when outcomes of 
positive or negative valence are used. Results from these 
studies have shown that unlike traditional associative 
conditioning, evaluative conditioning does not require 
contingency awareness (Jones, Fazio & Olson, 2009; 
Walther, 2002, Walther & Nagengast, 2006), is highly 
resistant to extinction (Baeyens, Days & Ruiz, 2005), and 
may be insensitive to cue competition effects (Beckers et 
al, 2009). Although these findings support the view that 
Pavlovian and evaluative learning constitute different types 
of learning processes (see Baeyens et al 2005; Walther, 
2002) this distinction has remained controversial for over 
a decade (Field, 2000).
 In spite of the lack of sufficient empirical data examining 
the differential effects of consequences of positive and 
negative valence on causal attributions, the studies reviewed 
above suggest that higher magnitude consequences and 
consequences rated as aversive, may be associated with 
lower attributions of causality to the target stimulus (e.g., 
greater blocking effect).
 In the present study, participants observed a series of 
pharmacological reports describing the consequences of 
consuming one or two combined substances. The sample was 
divided in two groups. One group was presented with high 
magnitude consequences and the other, with low magnitude 
consequences only. Substances with positive and negative 
consequences were presented to both groups. In contrast 
with most human causal learning studies, in addition to 
reporting probability ratings about the causal function of the 
stimuli, we report whether or not the participants would be 
willing to consume the target substance. Therefore, causal 
attributions are examined using two types of measures. 
The first one is intended to provide logical and deliberate 
responses and; the second one, attempts to produce causal 
attributions prompted by a context in which intuitive 
reasoning is more likely (see García-Retamero & Dieckman, 
2006; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).
 Generally, above-criterion ratings of causality are 
considered as indicators of causal attribution to each of 
the stimuli evaluated. However, results from a pilot study 
conducted in our lab showed that participants reporting 
a 0.5 probability that a substance will produce an effect, 
may also report that this substance will cause the effect, 
when presented with a Yes or No question. By including 
both types of questions we explore the possible differences 
in causal attributions when responses of the intuitive and 
deliberate sorts are induced. 
Method
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the possible 
differences in causality judgments when the outcome of an 
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ambiguous situation (blocking effect procedure) is either of 
high magnitude, or low magnitude, and when it is positive 
or negative valued. Effect magnitude was evaluated between 
groups and stimulus valence was evaluated within groups.
 The experiment presented participants with reports of 
a pharmaceutical laboratory describing the consequences 
of consuming different types of substances. Substances 
with positive consequences presented during the first phase 
of the blocking procedure were A+, B+, C- and D-, and 
substances included in the second phase were AE+, HI+ 
and JK-. Substance E corresponded to the target stimulus, 
substance A to the competitor, HI was the control stimulus, 
and B, C, D and JK were used as fillers. Substances with 
negative consequences were designated with numbers as 
follows: the first training phase included stimuli 1+, 2-, 
3+ and 4- and the second phase included stimuli 15+, 67+ 
and 89-. Substance 5 was the target stimulus, substance 
1 the competitor, substances 67+ were the controls, and 
substances 2, 3, 4, and 89 were included as fillers. The 
“+” sign in front of each letter or number indicates the 
occurrence of a consequence following the consumption 
of a substance, and the sign “-” indicates the absence of a 
consequence following the consumption of a substance.
Participants
The participants were 62 college students ranging from 18 
to 29 years of age. All participants agreed to participate in 
the study for course credit benefits, and signed informed 
consent. Participants were assigned to each of the groups 
(high and low magnitude) by order of arrival. 
Instruments
The experimental tasks were presented in desktop computers 
(17 inches monitors) located in individual workstations. All 
the experimental tasks were programmed in the software 
LabView v. 2011.
Procedure
Consequence selection (Pre-experimental phase): All 
the events to be used as consequences were selected prior 
to the design and programming of the experimental task. 
Twenty college students rated 15 positive and negative 
statements of high and low magnitude in a 1 to 5 Likert 
scale. Statements with average ratings above 4 and below 
2 were pre-selected and finally the statements with the 
highest and lowest scores were selected for the study. The 
consequences selected for each group are shown in Table 1.
Training Phase 1: At the beginning the experimental task, 
the following instructions were presented on the computer 
screen: “You are currently working for a pharmaceutical 
laboratory. Your job is to review some of the clinical records 
describing the effects of different types of substances in 
a population sample. You will note that in some cases 
substances were consumed individually while in some 
others, two substances were consumed in combination. 
Based on the information provided on these records, 
you will be asked to answer a couple of questions. Your 
answers will help the pharmaceutical company establish 
the effectiveness of each of these substances”.
 During the first training phase participants were 
exposed to 3 A+, B+, C- and D-trials in which substances 
were associated to positive consequences, and to 3 1+, 
2-, 3+ y 4 trials in which substances were presented with 
negative consequences. The stimuli in all 12 trials were 
presented in semi-random order. Each trial consisted 
on the presentation of a statement describing the effect 
of consuming a particular substance. For A+ trials for 
example, the following statement was presented: “People 
who have consumed substance A become immune to all 
viruses for life”. In front of this statement an illustration 
of the lab report was presented. The illustration showed a 
container labeled “Substance A” with a brief description of 
the observed effect printed below. There was no time limit 
for each trial. The next trial began when the participant 
clicked on a button labeled “continue”.
 After this first training phase was completed, a filter 
test evaluated acquisition of the previously trained relations. 
Four containers corresponding to the 4 substances presented 
during the first training phase were shown on the top half 
of the computer screen. Two blank squares were presented 
below. One of them was labeled “produces the effect” and 
the other one was labeled “does not produce the effect”. 
Participants were asked to drag the containers into the correct 
square according to whether the substance in the container 
produced an effect or not. One incorrect classification reset 
the presentation of all training trials and of the sorting test; 
and two incorrect classifications ended the experiment. A 
correct classification of the four substances was followed 
by the presentation of the second training phase.
13
Magnitude and valence of outcomes as determinants of causal judgments
Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología Volumen 45 No 1 pp. 9-20 2013 ISSN 0120-0534
Table 1
Positive and negative consequences
presented to each of the groups
Group 1. High magnitude
Negative Positive
Total and irreversible blindness Life immunity to all viruses 
Negative Positive
An elbow rash lasting 15 minutes
Increased virus immunity for an 
afternoon
Table 2
Order of presentation of all experimental 
phases for participants in both groups
Type of effect / experimental phase Substances and effects
Positive effect
Training phase 1
Filter test 
Training phase 2
Test 1. Intuitive reasoning
Test 2. Logical reasoning.
A+, B+, C-, D-
A, B, C, D.
AE+, JK-, HI+
A, B, C, D, E, J, K, H, I
A, B, C, D, E, J, K, H, I
Negative effect
Training phase 1
Filter test
Training phase 2
1+, 2-, 3+, 4-
1, 2, 3, 4
15+, 67+, 89-
Test 1. Intuitive reasoning
Test 2. Logical reasoning.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Training Phase 2: During the second phase participants 
were exposed to AE+ HI+ and JK- pairings of substances 
and their positive consequences. Associations of substances 
with negative consequences included 15+, 67+ and 89- 
pairings. As in the first training phase, each compound 
stimulus and its effect was presented semi-randomly 3 
times, for a total of 9 trials for each set of substances. The 
format of presentation of substances and consequences in 
each trial was the same as the one described for the first 
training phase. After all the 9 training trials were completed, 
the first evaluation of causality judgments was presented.
Test 1. Intuitive Reasoning: For this test, containers 
corresponding to the 9 substances presented previously 
in the two training phases were arranged evenly in 3 rows 
and columns. An instruction asked participants to answer 
whether or not they would drink from each of the containers 
shown on the screen. Answers were recorded by clicking 
on one of the two boxes in front of each container labeled 
Yes and No. All answers were required to continue with 
the next phase of the experiment.
Test 2. Logical reasoning: The logical reasoning test 
consisted of 9 trials. In each trial, participants were asked to 
indicate the probability of a consequence after consuming 
each of the substances separately. Participants were instructed 
to indicate their answer on a 0 to100 scale presented below 
each question.
 Table 2 below, shows the order of presentation of all 
training and testing phases and the associations presented 
in each phase. As this table shows, participants were first 
exposed to all training and testing phases with substances 
and their positive effects. Following this, the same sequence 
of training and testing was presented for substances with 
negative effects. Participants in both groups (high and low 
magnitude) were exposed to the same experimental setup.
Results
A (2 x 2 x 2) mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was 
conducted with magnitude (high and low) as the between 
subjects factor, and valence of the consequences (positive 
and negative) and experimental condition (target and 
control stimuli) as within subjects factors. The analysis of 
variance did not show main effects for valence, magnitude, 
or experimental condition. Table 3 presents mean ratings 
observed for each of the factors included in the analysis.
 As Table 3 shows, none of the substances were rated 
with probabilities of producing the effect higher than 55% 
in average. Contrary to the predictions of the blocking 
effect, no significant differences between causality ratings 
for target and control substances were observed. However, 
a significant interaction effect between valence (positive 
– negative) and experimental condition (target - control) 
was obtained, with F (1, 60) = 4.41, p = 0.04, and partial 
η2 = 0.06. Table 4 presents the means obtained for the 
interaction valence x experimental condition.
 The target substance was rated lower on the causal 
probability scale than the control substance but only when 
the effects of consuming these substances were positive. 
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The opposite effect was observed for causal attributions 
scores to substances with negative effects. Even though the 
difference between scores for target and control stimuli 
does not exceed 9 percentage points, it is consistent with 
the blocking effect in that lower causality ratings were 
observed for the target stimulus. However this is the case 
for target and control stimuli with positive consequences 
only. (see Figure 1). Note though that probability ratings 
for all the stimuli included in this analysis were not higher 
than 53%.
Table 3
Mean scores and standard deviations of
causal attribution measures reported by
participants in both groups.
Substances Magnitude Mean scores S. D.
E (target/positive) 
Low
High
Total
40.64
48.70
44.67
26.82
26.04
26.53
I (control/positive) 
Low
High
Total
55.16
51.12
53.14
28.85
28.03
28.28
5 (target/negative) 
Low
High
Total
53.22
50.16
51.69
25.77
23.00
24.27
7 (control/negative)
Low
High
Total
44.19
48.54
46.37
25.85
25.27
25.44
Table 4
Mean scores and standard deviations of causal 
attribution measures reported by participants
in both groups.
Valence
Target-
Control
Mean S.E.
C.I. 95%
Lower Higher
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Target
Control
Target
Control
44.67
53.14
51.69
46.37
3.35
3.61
3.10
3.24
37.96
45.91
45.48
39.87
51.39
60.37
57.89
52.86
 In contrast with this results, mean scores of causal 
attribution for all other stimuli/substances not included 
in the ANOVA, were much higher than those observed 
for target and control stimuli. While mean scores for 
substances E (target/positive), I (control/positive), 5 (target/
negative) and 7 (control/negative), range between 44 and 
53%, average scores for all other substances (competitor 
stimulus A and filler B / for positive valence stimuli, and 
competitor stimulus 1 and filler 6 for negative valence 
stimuli) range between 66 and 80% (see Table 5).
 Note though that substances H and 6 (which are part 
of control stimuli HI and 67) were rated similarly than 
substances I and 7 included in the analysis of variance. That 
Figure 1. Interaction effects between levels of valence, and experimental condition.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of causal attribution for all 
substances.
Substances with positive 
effects
Minimum Maximum Mean S. D.
A
B
E
H
I
0
0
0
0
0
100
100
100
100
100
80.48
78.62
44.67
49.75
53.14
31.59
32.46
26.53
25.12
28.28
Substances with negative 
effects
1
3
5
6
7
0
0
0
0
0
100
100
100
100
100
75.72
66.45
51.69
50.08
46.37
33.55
40.96
24.27
24.55
25.44
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is, participants attributed approximately a 50% probability 
that each separate element of the compound produced 
the effect. The elements of the AE and 15 compounds 
also presented during the second training phase were 
rated quite differently though. While a probability rating 
close to 50% was attributed to target stimuli E and 5, 
their corresponding competitors (presented alone with 
the consequence during training phase 1) obtained the 
highest causal attribution scores.
 Attributions of causality based on Yes or No answers 
to the intuitive reasoning question were also examined. 
Table 6 shows the percentage of participants in each group 
(high and low magnitude) who attributed causality to 
each substance (responded Yes to the intuitive reasoning 
question). These data show clear differences between groups 
of high and low magnitude with respect to their causality 
judgments. While most of the participants in the low 
magnitude group attributed causality to each one of the 
substances, less than 39% of the participants in the high 
magnitude group did.
Table 6
Percentage of participants in each group who 
attributed causality to each substance based 
on the intuitive reasoning question (Yes / No).
Substances with positive effects High magnitude Low magnitude
A (competitor)
B (filler)
E (target)
H (control)
I (control)
19.4
19.4
32.3
22.6
22.6
77.4
83.9
48.4
54.8
64.5
Substances with negative effects
1 (competitor)
3 (filler)
5 (target)
6 (control)
7 (control)
22.6
38.7
29
38.7
32.3
64.5
64.6
61.3
54.8
41.9
High magnitude, n = 31; Low magnitude, n = 31
 Finally, in order to contrast the degree of coincidence 
between causality judgments based on answers to the 
logical reasoning question (scores on the probability scale), 
and those based on answers to the intuitive reasoning 
question (yes/no answers), we examined the scores reported 
by participants who answered yes or no to the intuitive 
reasoning question about the causality of each substance. 
To facilitate data inspection, causality ratings were divided 
in 4 equal groups: the first group includes ratings from 
0 to 25%, the second group includes ratings from 26 to 
50%, the third group includes ratings from 51 to 75% and 
the last group includes scores from 76 to 100%. Data for 
participants in high and low magnitude groups are shown 
in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. 
Table 7
High magnitude group: Percentage of
participants who answered YES or NO to the 
intuitive reasoning question classified
according to their ratings on the causality scale.
Ranges 
on the 
attribution 
scale
E 
(target/
positive)
I
(control/
positive)
5 
(target/
negative)
7
(control/
negative)
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
0-25 %
26-50 %
51-75 %
76-100 
30
50
0
20
9.5
71.4
9.5
9.6
42.9
42.9
0
14.3
8.4
70.8
0
20.8
22.2
55.6
0
22.2
9
77.2
4.5
9
50
30
10
10
4.8
76.2
4.8
14.3
n = 10 11 7 24 9 22 10 21
Table 8
Low magnitude group: Percentage of
participants who answered YES or NO to the 
intuitive reasoning question classified according 
to their ratings on the causality scale.
Ranges 
on the 
attribution 
scale
E 
(target/
positive)
I
(control/
positive)
5 
(target/
negative)
7
(control/
negative)
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
0-25 %
26-50 %
51-75 %
76-100 
26.7
60
6.7
6.7
25
62.6
6.3
6.3
5
55
10
30
27.3
63.6
0
9.1
10.5
73.8
0
15.8
8.3
58.3
16.6
16.6
7.7
84.6
0
7.7
27.8
55.5
5.6
11.1
n = 15 16 20 11 19 12 13 18
 Most of the participants in the high magnitude group 
did not attribute causality to any of the substances based on 
the reports to the intuitive reasoning question (see Table 6). 
In addition, most of the participants who answered yes and 
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no to the intuitive reasoning question reported probability 
scores lower than 50%. The same was observed for the low 
magnitude group. In general, the data shown in Tables 7 
and 8 do not seem consistent with the predictions of the 
blocking effect. The number of participants who did not 
attribute causality to target substances E and 5 was not 
higher than the number of participants who attributed 
causality to control substances I and 7.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to analyze the effects of 
two properties of the consequences on human causality 
judgments. Specifically the effects of the positive or negative 
valence of the consequences, and the effect of high and low 
magnitude consequences on attributions of causality were 
examined using a blocking procedure. According to some 
authors some of the inconsistencies in the observation of 
the blocking effect in humans are due to the fact that the 
blocking procedure constitutes an ambiguous situation 
with respect to cause-consequence relations (Beckers et 
al, 2005; Vandorpe & De Houwer, 2006; Vandorpe et al, 
2005). The present study evaluated the blocking effect in a 
human causal learning preparation including consequences 
with a positive or negative affective value, and consequences 
of high and low magnitude.
 The occurrence of the blocking effect was evaluated 
using two measures of causal attribution. In one of them 
participants reported on a 0 to 100 scale the probability 
that consuming each substance separately would produce 
an effect. In the other, participants reported whether or 
not they would be willing to drink each of the substances 
separately. The first report was interpreted to be the result 
of logical reasoning and the second, was interpreted as a 
product of intuitive reasoning (see García-Retamero & 
Dieckmann, 2006; Tversy & Kahneman, 1974).
 Additionally, because the traditional blocking procedure 
includes a control condition (i.e., presenting a compound 
stimuli with elements that have not been associated 
previously with the outcome), our analysis included a 
comparison between the causal attribution ratings of target 
and control stimuli.
 Although main effects for magnitude, valence or 
experimental condition (target or control stimuli) were not 
observed, a significant interaction effect between valence 
and experimental condition was obtained. This interaction 
effect was consistent with the predictions of the blocking 
effect but only for substances with positive consequences. 
Lower scores of causal attribution were reported for the 
target positive substance (E) than for the control substance 
(I) in the HI control compound. However, the opposite 
relation between target and control stimuli was observed 
for substances with negative outcomes.
 Apparently negative consequences may be associated 
with a higher likelihood of transfer of outcome functions 
to the target stimulus. Because these functions are acquired 
by the competitor stimulus during the first training phase 
of the blocking procedure, they may be transferred to the 
target stimulus due to the contiguous presentations of target 
and competitor. In contrast, increased cue competition was 
observed for substances with positive consequences Once 
substance A acquires some of the functions of the outcome 
during the first training phase, substance E cannot further 
contribute to the prediction of the outcome. As a result 
lower causality scores are attributed to the target substance 
than to competitor and control substances. 
 It is important to clarify though that the blocking 
effect was not observed in either case. By saying that the 
results observed for positive substances were consistent 
with the predictions of the blocking effect, we simply 
mean that causality scores for the target substance where 
lower than those for the control substance. Mean scores 
for these substances varied within a very small range with 
a minimum of 45% and a maximum of 53%. A non very 
conservative criterion of 30% or lower on the attribution 
scale for the target stimuli, in addition to higher than 50% 
ratings for competitor and control stimuli, were considered 
indicative of the blocking effect. Contrary to expectations 
however, extreme scores on the attribution scale were not 
observed. This is further evidenced by the low effect size 
obtained for the significant interaction effect between 
valence of the consequences and experimental condition. 
 Causality scores of around 50% suggest that the 
information provided regarding cause-consequence relations 
is insufficient to attribute a higher or lower probability 
rating for the stimuli evaluated. These findings support 
the claim that some of the inconsistencies with respect to 
the occurrence of the blocking effect in humans may be 
related to the interference of deliberate reasoning about 
the contingencies to which participants are exposed (De 
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participants in the hypothetical situation was considered 
a good prompt for responses based on intuitive reasoning. 
The question as it was formulated, however, may have 
introduced an uncontrolled source of variability.
 Future research could examine the effect of outcome 
valence on causal attribution ratings,  when outcomes 
are presented at submaximal values. Several studies have 
shown that this manipulation provides participants with 
the necessary information to determine the contribution of 
each of the elements of a compound in the production of a 
consequence, thus increasing the probability of observing a 
blocking effect (Beckers et al, 2005; De Houwer & Beckers, 
2003; De Houwer et al, 2002; Vandorpe et al, 2005). After 
controlling for the variability produced by the different 
ways in which individuals respond to compound stimuli 
(configurally or elementally), a more accurate assessment 
of the effect of outcome valence and magnitude on causal 
attribution ratings, could be achieved.
 A procedural variation that would be interesting to 
explore consists of describing cause and consequence relations 
in a single trial description (resumed procedure) as opposed 
to exposing participants to a history of stimulus pairings. 
While the latter procedure has been useful for studying 
learning processes in non-human animals and non-verbal 
individuals, the study of human learning processes may 
benefit from the use of procedures with higher ecological 
validity (see, e.g., García-Retamero, Ramos & Catena, 
2008). Researchers in our lab are currently replicating the 
experiment presented here using a resumed procedure. 
 The present study examined relations of causality with 
an added component from the evaluative conditioning 
literature, namely, the valence of the consequences. Our 
findings are consistent with those of a recent study showing 
that evaluative conditioning may be insensitive to the 
blocking effect (Beckers et al, 2009). However, the view 
that evaluative conditioning and Pavlovian conditioning 
constitute different types of learning processes (see Bar-
Anan, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2010) needs further empirical 
and theoretical support. Similarly, additional empirical 
evidence is also required to determine if the principles of 
associative learning are sufficient to describe and explain 
complex human behavior or if different explanatory models 
are required.
Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010; Karazinov & Boakes, 2007; 
Walther, 2002; Walther et al, 2005). 
 On the other hand all competitors (substance A for 
the group of substances with positive consequences and 
substance 1 for the group of substances with negative 
consequences), were attributed the highest causality ratings 
with mean scores of 75% and above. In contrast, each of 
the elements of control stimuli HI and 67, were rated with 
mean scores of approximately 50%. These data suggest 
that the information available may not be sufficient to 
determine with a high degree of certainty if each of the 
substances of the compound stimuli is responsible for 
the effect.
 On the other hand, asking participants if they were 
willing to consume each of the substances separately was 
intended to prompt causality judgments based on intuitive 
reasoning; that is, in the absence of a logical analysis of 
the probabilities involved. These causality judgments show 
notable differences between the high and low magnitude 
groups. A higher percentage of participants in the low 
magnitude group attributed causality to all substances. 
A lower percentage of participants attributed causality to 
target and control substances compared to the percentage 
of participants who attributed causality to the remaining 
substances (competitors and fillers). However, because 
a higher number of participants who did not attribute 
causality to the target stimuli was not observed (compared 
to attributions of causality to control stimuli), a blocking 
effect for these data cannot be concluded either. The 
examination of attribution scores reported by participants 
who answered yes or no to the intuitive reasoning question 
shows that the majority of participants reported probabilities 
that an effect will be produced by a substance between 25 
and 50% regardless of whether they attributed causality 
to the substance or not (answered yes or no).
 Asking participants whether or not each substance 
produces the effect, rather than asking whether or not they 
would consume the substance could have been a more 
objective measure of causal attribution. Answers to the latter 
question may reflect the participants’ interest/disinterest in 
the hypothetical effect produced by the substances rather 
than their causal judgments. However, the question used 
was preferred to a more direct one because involving the 
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